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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040499CA

v.
PAULA POULSON,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of
possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a third
degree felony (R. 218-20).

This court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)(West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Did the magistrate properly determine that the search
warrant affidavit, when viewed in its entirety and in a common
sense fashion, provided a substantial basis for determining that
probable cause existed to believe drugs would be found in
defendant's home?
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress a search
warrant, the appellate court affords the magistrate "great
deference."

State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 17, 104 P.3d 1265.

The appellate court does not review the magistrate's probable
cause determination de novo, but rather determines "whether the
magistrate had a ^substantial basis' for determining that
probable cause existed."

State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 1 14, 48

P.3d 872 (citation omitted).

In making this determination, the

court does not engage in "* [e]xcessive technical dissection of an
informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the officer's
affidavit.'"

Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 57 (quoting State v. Hansen,

732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of possession of a
controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute,
a second degree felony; possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana) with intent to distribute, possession of a controlled
substance (methamphetamine), possession of a controlled substance
(psilicybin mushrooms), all third degree felonies; and possession
of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-3). The
-2-

magistrate bound defendant over for trial, and defendant filed a
motion to suppress, which the trial court denied (R. 20-21, 2831, 48-49).

Defendant filed a second motion to suppress.

After

a hearing, the court denied that motion as well (R. 148-63, 16981 at addendum A ) .

Defendant then entered a conditional guilty

plea to one count of possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, and the State dismissed
the remaining charges (R. 184-89, 203-04).

The trial court

sentenced defendant to a suspended prison term of zero-to-five
years, with 60 days in the Sanpete County jail; ordered that she
pay a fine of $5000; and imposed various conditions (R. 219).
Defendant moved for a certificate of probable cause, which the
trial court granted (R. 182, 203-04).

Defendant also filed a

timely notice of appeal (R. 207-08).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
Between June 19th and August 14th, 2002, members of the
Central Utah Narcotics Task Force engaged in surveillance of the
home defendant shared with Terry Hanks in Mount Pleasant (R. 206:
2; R. 238-40 at addendum B ) .
A citizen informant had provided officers with vehicle
license numbers of individuals who, more than once, arrived at
defendant's residence and then departed within 2-3 minutes (R.
238).

Of the individuals so identified, seven had convictions

1

The Statement of Facts is based on recitations
in the
search warrant affidavit and its supporting attachment, and in
the presentence investigation report.
-3-

for possession or use of a controlled substance, either
methamphetamine or marijuana (R. 238-39).

Three identified

persons had been arrested for or convicted of crimes of violence
Id.

In addition, more than 14 other separate vehicles had

briefly stopped at the home during the surveillance period, some
on more than one occasion (R. 239; R. 225: 8).
On August 8th, officers executed a search warrant on the
home of Gary Sorenson, one of the seven

individuals with drug-

related convictions whose vehicles had been seen at defendant's
home (R. 239). Although Sorenson was absent when the officers
executed the warrant, they found methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia in his home.

Id.

On the following two days,

August 9th and 10th, officers again observed Sorenson at
defendant's home.

Id.

Four days after officers executed the warrant on Sorenson's
home, they met with a confidential informant, who stated that
defendant had been and was continuing to sell methamphetamine for
Sorenson.

Id.

The officers deemed this information reliable

because the confidential informant had previously given accurate
information to law enforcement (R. 236 at addendum C).

Further,

the information dovetailed with the report of a third informant,
who reported personal knowledge that defendant was selling
methamphetamine for Sorenson (R. 239). This informant reported
seeing defendant pick up methamphetamine from Sorenson's
residence on more than one occasion. JcL.

-4-

Based on this information, officers obtained a daytime noknock search warrant and executed it on defendant's home (R. 24243 at addendum D).

They discovered marijuana and drug

paraphernalia in plain view as well as large quantities of
marijuana, methamphetamine, psilocybin mushrooms, and
paraphernalia suitable for packaging drugs (R. 206: 3).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Applying a probable cause analysis that the Utah Supreme
Court has since disavowed, defendant argues that the trial court
should have granted her suppression motion because the magistrate
issued a search warrant for her home without sufficient probable
cause to believe contraband would be found there.

She contends

that the affidavit was insufficient because the facts were not
sufficiently detailed, the information was undated, the
informants were unnamed, and the police failed to corroborate
any of the information.

See Br. of Aplt. at 12-13.

Under the correct totality of the circumstances test, the
magistrate's probable cause determination should be affirmed.
First, a citizen informant, whose reliability may be presumed,
provided information based on personal knowledge about short-term
traffic at defendant's home that was consistent with an on-going
drug sales operation.

Second, police conducted surveillance on

the home, and ran license plate and criminal history checks on
the short-term traffic they observed.

The training and

experience of the officers suggested that the short-term traffic
-5-

was likely indicative of drug transactions occurring within the
home, and the criminal history checks corroborated that multiple
individuals with drug-related histories were briefly and
repeatedly stopping at the home.

Third, a confidential informant

who had previously provided accurate information to the police
reported that defendant had been and was continuing to sell drugs
for another individual whose home the police had recently
searched pursuant to a warrant and where drugs and paraphernalia
suggesting trafficking had been found.
When all this information is considered together, the
practical, common-sense conclusion is that the magistrate had a
substantial basis upon which to conclude that a fair probability
existed that contraband would be found in defendant's home.

No

more is necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
THE MAGISTRATE PROPERLY ISSUED THE
SEARCH WARRANT WHERE THE AFFIDAVIT,
WHEN VIEWED IN ITS ENTIRETY AND IN
A COMMON SENSE FASHION, PROVIDED A
SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR DETERMINING
THAT PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTED TO
BELIEVE DRUGS WOULD BE FOUND IN
DEFENDANT'S HOME
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted
her suppression motion because the magistrate issued a search
warrant for her home without sufficient probable cause to believe
drugs would be found there.2

She bases her argument on the

2

Defendant also briefly argues that the magistrate had an
insufficient basis upon which to issue a no-knock warrant. See
-6-

three-prong test for probable cause articulated in Kavsville City
v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997), subsequently
interpreted as mandatory in State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,
37 P.3d 260 and State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 40 P.3d 1136,
and most recently applied in State v. Saddler, 2003 UT App 82, 67
P.3d 1025, rev'd on cert,, 2005 UT 105, 104 P.3d 1265, and State
v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, 81 P.3d 783.3

See Br. of Aplt. at 16-

18, 21, 22-23.

Br. of Aplt. at 31-32. Although defendant raised this issue in
her suppression motion, the trial court did not rule on it and
defendant failed to invoke a ruling on it. See R. 36, 42; R.
169-81 at addendum A. Even assuming that defendant properly
preserved the issue, however, her briefing is inadequate. She
argues that the no-knock warrant was issued solely because one of
the individuals observed stopping at the home had an assault
conviction. See Br. of Aplt. at 31. Defendant, however, wholly
ignores the reasons for requesting no-knock authorization
articulated in the search warrant. These included the "history
of violence ranging from assault to weapons and concealed weapons
violations" of several of the documented repeat visitors to the
home, as well as the officers' articulated training and
experience in executing search warrants for drugs. R. 243 at
addendum D; R. 241 at addendum E. Defendant's argument of less
than one page is inadequate because it fails to apply the law to
all of the facts. Consequently, this Court should decline to
consider it. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, 529, 63
P.3d 72 (declining to address issue where no legal analysis
except conclusory statement that defendant was entitled to
relief); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) & (j)(articulating requirement
for legal argumentation and providing for exclusion of matters
not presented in compliance with rule).
3

The three-prong test mandates consideration of: l)the
reliability of the informant; 2)the extent of the detailed
information provided by the informant; and 3)whether the police
personally corroborated the informant's tip. State v. Saddler,
2004 UT 105, 118 (citing Kavsville City v. Mulcahv, 943 P.2d at
235-36).
-7-

At the outset, since defendant filed her brief, the law upon
which she relied has been clarified by the Utah Supreme Court.
See State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 104 P.3d 1265.

Considering

the case on certiorari review, the supreme court rejected the
"exacting" and "technical" three-factor analysis for assessing
probable cause articulated in Mulcahy and its progeny and
reiterated its endorsement of the more flexible "totality of the
circumstances" test articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 4 62 U.S.
213 (1983).

Saddler, 2004

UT 105 at 515110-11.

three factors are still relevant.

Under Gates, the

However,

[t]hey are not strict, independent
requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every
case. A weakness in one or the other is not
fatal to the warrant so long as in the
totality there is substantial basis to find
probable cause. The indicia of veracity,
reliability, and basis of knowledge are
nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in
reaching the practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances, there
is a fair probability that the contraband
will be found in the place described.
Saddler, 2004 UT 105, 511 (quoting State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127,
130 (Utah 1997)(quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233-34)).
In this case, the district court issued a lengthy memorandum
decision, detailing its reasons for denying defendant's
suppression motion and affirming the magistrate's determination
that probable cause sufficiently supported the search warrant.
See R. 169-81 at Addendum A.

Although issuing its decision

almost ten months before the Utah Supreme Court's Saddler
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opinion, the district court presciently — and with startling
accuracy —

tracked the supreme court's reasoning in Saddler.

The district court first addressed the difficulty of
squaring this Court's Saddler opinion with Illinois v. Gates (R.
169).

After briefly reviewing the history of the Fourth

Amendment, including various models for assessing probable cause,
the court noted that Gates' reaffirmation of the totality of the
circumstances test grew out of a line of lower court cases that
had strayed from the proper test.

These cases had calcified what

were originally guidelines for a magistrate's assessment of
probable cause into inflexible and independent requirements for
probable cause (R. 172). Likewise, the Utah cases on which
defendant relied in her suppression motion, while reciting the
Gates totality of the circumstances test, in fact applied a more
rigid set of requirements.

The district court observed, "[W]hat

began as helpful analytical tools eventually developed a life
[sic] of their own and reached mandatory status" (R. 173).

These

cases, the court concluded, evidenced "an analytical approach
somewhat akin to that rejected in Gates" (R. 173) .
Quoting extensively from the Gates rationale, buttressed by
language from the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987), the district court then
reaffirmed the necessity of analyzing probable cause in a common
sense, non-technical, reasonable manner, consistent with the
practical reality that search warrant affidavits are prepared by
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individuals who are neither judges nor lawyers (R. 176-78).

The

court explained its role in reviewing the magistrate's
determination:
[TJhe end objective is to determine if the
magistrate who viewed the affidavit in that
manner [i.e. in a non-technical, common sense
manner through the eyes of a layman] had a
"substantial basis for . . . , [concluding]
that a search warrant would uncover evidence
of wrongdoing," Gates at 236, or that there
was "a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime . . . [would] be found in
a particular place." Gates at 238; accord
Hansen at 130. I further avoid a "technical
dissection of an informant's tip or of the
nontechnical language in the officer's
affidavit," the same being "ill-suited to the
task" of a common sense analysis and
construction. Id.
R. 178.
Having thus articulated the applicable law, the district
court then applied it, determining that the information supplied
by the police in the affidavit was unchallenged; that the citizen
informant's information may be presumed valid; and that the
confidential informant's veracity was bolstered both by the
testimony of the citizen informant and by her previously
providing the police with accurate information (R. 178-79) .
Considering the totality of these facts and applying a common
sense approach, the court concluded that the magistrate had "a
^substantial basis for . . . [concluding]' that there was a ^fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime . . . [would]
be found' at [defendant's] residence, or *that a search would

-10-

uncover evidence of wrongdoing'" (R. 180 (citations omitted)).4
On appeal, defendant attacks the confidential informant's
reliability and veracity.

See Br. of Aplt. at 19-23.

Officers

met with this informant on August 12th, four days after executing
a warrant on the home of a convicted drug dealer, Gary Sorenson,
in whose home officers had found quantities of drugs and
paraphernalia suggesting trafficking, and just two days after
observing Sorenson making yet another brief stop at defendant's
home (R. 239) .5

The informant told officers that defendant had

4

The court's decision does, however, incorrectly combine
the statements of two informants. The search warrant affidavit
refers to the first and third informants as citizen informants.
See Aff. at 2. At the suppression hearing, however, the State
clarified that the third informant's reliability should not be
presumed, as would be typical with a citizen informant, because
she provided the information only after police had arrested and
incarcerated her. See R. 225 at 4-5 at addendum B. The district
court's memorandum decision incorrectly merges the information
provided by the first and third informants, presuming reliability
for all of it. See R. 179 at addendum A. The brief of appellant
confuses the facts in a different way. There, both the first and
third informants are referred to as citizen informants and the
second informant, who was a confidential informant, is referred
to as a criminal informant. Br. of Aplt. at 20.
5

There was also a third informant, characterized in the
affidavit as another "citizen informant." At the suppression
hearing, the State clarified that this so-called citizen
informant spoke to the police only after she had been arrested
and incarcerated and that her statement should not be subject to
the presumption of reliability or veracity typically attaching to
a citizen informant. See R. 225: 4-5 at addendum F; State v.
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 514, 40 P.3d 1136, 1140 (citations
omitted). This informant told the police that she had personally
seen defendant at Sorenson' s home picking up methamphetamine more
than once, and that she had personal knowledge that defendant was
selling methamphetamine for Sorenson (R. 239 at addendum B ) . The
State does not rely on the information she provided to justify
issuance of the warrant.
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been selling quantities of methamphetamine for Gary Sorenson and
was still continuing to do so (R. 242-43 at addendum D ) .

As

noted in the affidavit, this informant had previously worked with
Officer Thomas and had provided him with accurate information.
See State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130 (informant's past history of
supplying police with truthful information constitutes accepted
method for establishing informant veracity)(citations omitted).
Defendant's further contention that the informant was necessarily
unreliable because his name was not disclosed is similarly
without merit.6

See Br. of Aplt. at 22-23.

Officer Thomas

asserted in his search warrant affidavit that the confidential
informant had previously given him accurate information (R. 236
at addendum C ) .

While the affidavit did not unambiguously state

that Thomas knew the informant's name, the magistrate could
reasonably have inferred that since the affiant and the informant
had a history of successfully working together, the officer knew
the informant's identity.

On review, this Court defers to the

magistrate's reasonable construction of ambiguous language in an
affidavit.

State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987, 992 (Utah 1989).

6

Defendant also notes that the information did not come
directly to the affiant from the confidential informant. See Br.
of Aplt. at 20. Although neither of the officers with whom the
confidential informant met drafted the affidavit, affiant Thomas,
a fellow law enforcement officer, was entitled to rely on the
information they gave him. See State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085,
1088 (Utah 1986) (in making probable cause determination, police
officer can rely on information gained from other police
officers).
-12-

Defendant also argues that the affidavit fails to include
"any relevant time periods'7 and, consequently, that

MA

there is no

way to determine whether the information is stale.'" Br. of Aplt.
at 29 (citation omitted).

"A mere passage of time[, however,]

does not necessarily invalidate the supporting basis for the
warrant."

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d at 131.

In this case, the

pattern of short-stay visits Sorenson made to defendant's home
occurred over a specified two-month period, culminating in the
issuance of the warrant.

These visits continued unabated even

after officers had executed a warrant on Sorenson's home and
found contraband indicative of drug dealing there.

Such evidence

strongly suggests the ongoing nature of an unlawful enterprise.
See State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1983) (common
sense reading of affidavit suggested continuing nature of
presence of drugs).
The search warrant was further supported by the information
provided by a citizen informant.

This informant personally

reported to affiant Thomas that, since June 19th, he had observed
a lot of short-term traffic at defendant's home, coming and going
within two to three minutes (R. 238 at addendum B ) .

This

informant had personal knowledge of individuals visiting the home
and provided Thomas with license numbers of vehicles, some of
which had made multiple brief stops at the residence (Id.).

He

had a strong basis of knowledge because his information was based
on personal observations of the traffic at defendant's home and

-13-

because he personally knew some of the individuals involved.
Notably, this informant provided no information about drugdealing.

His observations were limited to a particular kind of

traffic at defendant's home.
As to the reliability of the citizen informant, "an ordinary
citizen-informant needs no independent proof of reliability or
veracity."

State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 514 (quotation and

citation omitted).

Nonetheless, the license plate number

provided by the citizen informant for Sorenson, one of the
individuals who made multiple stops at defendant's home,
dovetailed with information police subsequently discovered.

That

is, the confidential informant later told police that defendant
was selling methamphetamine for Sorenson, and the officers
themselves later discovered drugs and paraphernalia at Sorenson's
home (R. 239).
Members of the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force
corroborated the information provided by the citizen informant
by working the case from June 19th until the warrant was issued
and executed on August 14th (R. 236, 238). By conducting
surveillance, they confirmed the short-stay activity at
defendant's home.

They ran license numbers provided by the

citizen informant, identified vehicle owners, and ran criminal
history checks.

They identified eight individuals with

significant criminal histories, all of whom had been charged with
drug crimes and seven of whom had at least one drug conviction.

-14-

Two of the eight had also been charged with domestic violence.

A

third had an assault conviction, and a fourth had a conviction
for escape from official custody (R. 238-39).
Task force members attested that in their collective
experience, the activity they noted at defendant's home was
"consistent with the distribution of controlled substances" (R.
239).

Such corroboration bolsters the probable cause

determination.

See State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 516, 518 (Utah

App. 1992) (concluding that where detective "described his
narcotics experience" and observed short-terms stays at
defendant's residence "suggesting narcotics trafficking," such
corroboration supports probable cause finding); accord State v.
White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1196-97 (Utah App. 1993).
Under these circumstances, applying common sense and
omitting the information provided by the second "citizen
informant," the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding
there was a fair probability that defendant was dealing drugs
from her home and that controlled substances would be found
there.

Because the Fourth Amendment requires no more than this,

this Court should affirm the magistrate's issuance of the search
warrant and the trial court's denial of defendant's suppression
motion.

See, e.g., Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39 ("[T]he duty of a

reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a
^substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause
existed") (citation omitted)) .

-15-

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
convictions for one count each of burglary, a second degree
felony, and theft, a class B misdemeanor.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ff'day of June, 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

c
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General

-16-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Shelden R. Carter, attorney for appellant, 3325 North
University, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84604, this fficiay of June,
2005.
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Addenda

Addendum A

DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUMTy^yTAH-"
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: 435-835-2131 Fax: 435-835-2135
1i

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 021600147
vs.
Assigned Judge

K. L. McIFF

PAULA POULSON,
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant comes before the court a second time seeking suppression of evidence seized
from her personal residence pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the supporting affidavit and places reliance on two recent decisions of the court of appeals,
State v. Saddler, 67 P.3d 1025 (Utah App. 2003) and State v. Dable, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 49
(Utah App. 11/14/03). I am having some difficulty squaring the analytical approach in these
decisions with their claimed source, and with the landmark decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). For that reason, the legal analysis
which follows takes a slightly different track.

MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 021600147, Page -2LEGAL ANALYSIS
I begin with the observation that the right which is entitled to protection in this and
similar cases, has its origin in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and is
stated in remarkably few words:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause,....
[Emphasis added].
During the two hundred plus years that the Amendment has been in force, courts have
faced the challenge of giving substantive meaning to the simple words "unreasonable searches
and seizures" and "probable cause". In the beginning and for well in excess of a hundred years,
the effort tended to be more academic because the stakes were not so high. Frequently there
were no practical consequences flowing from a Fourth Amendment violation. All of that
changed with adoption of the so-called "exclusionary rule." Beginning in 1914 with the decision
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment could not be used in federal court criminal proceedings against the victim of the
illegal search. This prohibition was extended to state court proceedings in the 1961 decision in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. These decisions raised the stakes. Demonstration of probable
cause within affidavits supporting search warrants and review of those affidavits for
constitutional compliance became all important.
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stage for review of how courts have dealt with probable cause determinations. During the years
following Weeks and Mapp, courts developed various analytical models to apply the overarching
constitutional principles. The general tendency has been to develop mechanical formulas which
employ multi-prong tests, and examine the affidavits in piecemeal fashion. Not infrequently
these formulas originated as guidelines or analytical tools, only later to reach the status of
mandatory prerequisites. Experience teaches that once developed and cited repeatedly in
succeeding cases, mechanical formulas or approaches can take on a life of their own so that
principles are swallowed up by prongs and fundamental rights become subservient to the rules
designed to give them substance. In this process it has been, and remains, all too easy to become
so focused on the individual pieces that the overall mosaic becomes a blur.
That is precisely where Fourth Amendment jurisprudence stood in 1983 when the
Supreme Court of the United States decided Illinois v. Gates, supra. Prior to Gates, there had
developed a "two-pronged test" known as Aguilar - Spinelli. It derived from two supreme court
decisions, Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410
(1969). As applied by lower courts, this test required that both prongs be satisfied independent
of the other. As onefrequentlycited decision stated, "[T]he dual requirements represented by the
'two-pronged test' are 'analytically severable' and an 'overkill' on one prong will not carry over
to make up for a deficit on the other prong." Stanley v. State, 313 A.2d 847, 861 (Md. App.

i n i
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approach which had developed among the various lower courts, including the Illinois Supreme
Court (which decided Gates below) is exemplified in the following language from Gates:
In summary, these rules posit that the 'veracity' prong of the Spinelli test has two 'spurs'
- the informant's 'credibility' and the 'reliability' of his information. Various
interpretations are advanced for the meaning of the 'reliability' spur of the 'veracity'
prong. Both the "basis of knowledge" prong and the "veracity" prong are treated as
entirely separate requirements, which must be independently satisfied in every case in
order to sustain a determination of probable cause. 462 U.S. at 229, n.4.
Critical of this approach, the Gates court stated that "the direction taken by decisions
following Spinelli poorly serves the most basic function of any government." Id. at 237. It
concluded "that it is wiser to abandon the two-pronged t e s t . . . and to reaffirm the totality-of-thecircumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause determinations." At 238.
Moreover, it noted that its "original phrasing of the so called 'two-pronged test' in Aguilar . . .
suggests that the two prongs were intended simply as guides to a magistrate's determination of
probable cause, not as inflexible, independent requirements applicable in every c a s e . . . . " At 232.
[Emphasis added.] With regard to the Aguilar - Spinelli elements, it stated, "[T]hey are better
understood as relevant considerations in the totality of the circumstances analysis that
traditionally has guided probable-cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated
for in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some
other indicia of reliability." At 233.
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decisions on which defendant places principle reliance. In the end both Saddler and Dable
recognize that the totality-of-the-circumstances test is controlling, but each contains an analytical
approach somewhat akin to that rejected in Gates. Saddler and Dable claim that this approach is
mandated by Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Ut. App. 1997). No where does Mulcahy
suggest that it is establishing a mandatory analytical formula. The three factors considered by the
Mulcahy court do not appear to have been considered essential by it, but rather helpful factors
which the court "gleaned from prior Utah cases," 943 P.2d at 235. The court went on to state,
"we supplement and clarify our analysis with pertinent principles from the numerous other states
addressing facts more on point. . . ." (Id). Mulcahy then cited some 20 cases from all across
the United States. What flowed from Mulcahy is similar to what happened with Aguilar and
Spinelli. What began as helpful analytical tools eventually developed a life of their own and
reached mandatory status. With respect to the Mulcahy factors, the transition occurred in the
subsequent case of State v. Valensuela, 37 P.3d 260 (Ut. App. 2001). After reviewing Mulcahy,
the Valensuela court quotes this language: "Thus, we articulated 'three factors [a court must]
consider in determining the reliability and sufficiency of the informant's 'report' " Id. at 263.
[Emphasis added, but including only the court's words ] With the simple insertion of the
bracketed language, helpful guides became mandatory obligations. The transition was complete
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2001) and again in Saddler and Dable}
The two-pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli required that the affidavit (1) reveal the
informant's "basis of knowledge" and (2) provide sufficient facts to establish the informant's
"veracity" or the "reliability" of the informant's report. Under Gates, neither of these is now
considered mandatory. Such is acknowledged in numerous Utah cases including Saddler.
However, the first mandatory Saddler factor tracks the Aguilar and Spinelli test, combining basis
of knowledge with veracity and reliability. The Saddler court found the affidavit in question
satisfied the "basis of knowledge" requirement, but failed to establish "veracity" or "reliability".
It is difficult to distinguish the court's treatment and application of the first Mulcahy factor from
the Aguilar-Spinelh test.2 Saddler prompted a strong dissent which expressed the view that the
majority had afforded very little deference to the determination made by the magistrate, had paid
only lip service to the totality-of-the-circumstances standard required by Gates and had applied
the older and stricter Aguilar - Spinelli test. At best, the elevation of each of the Mulcahy factors

It may be important to note thztMulcahy involved a single issue of whether reasonable suspicion existed
to support the police in stopping and detaining a motorist based upon an informant's tip. It was in that context that
the court of appeals employed an analysis which relied upon three factors. The later cases overlaid these factors on
search warrant probable cause determinations by magistrates and made them mandatory.
Some may argue that the cases stemming fromMulcahy require only that the three factors be considered
as opposed to satisfied, but that is not the manner in whichSaddler treats the first factor.
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its harmony with Gates?
In light of the foregoing, and before reaching the affidavit supporting the search warrant
in this case, I consider it appropriate to outline in brief terms the law that is clearly appUcable and
concerning which no one should object. Gates reversed a trend that had developed over many
years. That trend had produced a mechanical and somewhat rigid approach which encouraged
focusing on the individual pieces rather than the overall mosaic. Gates adopted a "big-picture"
approach. What had previously been considered as "strict prerequisites for establishing probable
cause" instead became "relevant considerations" under the "totality-of-the-circumstances-test."
During the year of its publication, Gates was endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court in State v.
Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). Every known Utah precedent since then has continued to
endorse the Gates test including both Saddler and Dable. For that reason, direct reliance on
Gates should be safe ground for this court.
Gates still dictates how reviewing courts should evaluate affidavits in support of search
warrants. At the expense of brevity, but wanting the philosophical underpinning to be clear, I

It must be remembered that Gates involved an anonymous letter. There was no "face to face", no way to
evaluate the basis of knowledge, and no way to establish veracity or reliability except through confirmation by police
observations. Even then, the confirmations did not establish any wrongdoing. They were limited to confirming that
the anonymous letter's information about the travels of a husband and wife on an alleged trip to acquire illegal
controlled substances was accurate.
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are many, have been omitted to aid the flow. Gates is adequate support for the concepts.
[SJearch and arrest warrants long have been issued by persons who are neither lawyers
nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the
nature of "probable cause." The rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the
complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in
our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are - quite
properly - issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen
applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings. At
235-36.
[W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an
affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's "determination of
probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts." "A grudging or
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts
should not invalidate [warrants] by interpreting [affidavits] in a hypertechnical, rather
than a commonsense, manner." At 236.
Reflecting this preference for the warrant process, the traditional standard for review of
an issuing magistrate's probable-cause determination has been that so long as the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for .. . [concluding]" that a search would uncover
evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment requires no more. We think
reaffirmation of this standard better serves the purpose of encouraging recourse to the
warrant procedure and is more consistent with our traditional deference to the probablecause determinations of magistrates than is the "two-pronged test." At 236-37.
We also have said that "[although] in a particular case it may not be easy to determine
when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful
or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be
accorded to warrants." This reflects both a desire to encourage use of the warrant process
by police officers and a recognition that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the
case. At 237.
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impeding the task of law enforcement. If.. . that test must be rigorously applied in every
case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished value in police work. Ordinary
citizens . . . do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday
observations... [T]he veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis
largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom could survive a
rigorous application of either of the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when
supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of
otherwise "perfect crimes." While a conscientious assessment of the basis for crediting
such tips is required by the Fourth Amendment, a standard that leaves virtually no place
for anonymous citizen informants is not. At 237-38.
For all these reasons, we conclude that it is wiser to abandon the "two-pronged test"
established by our decisions in Aguilar and Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totalityof-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has informed probable-cause
determinations. The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that
the magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . . [concluding]" that probable cause existed.
At 238-39.
The language from the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah
1987), though abbreviated, embraces the same concepts and relies heavily on Gates:
Search warrant affidavits are to be construed in a common-sense, reasonable manner.
State v. Williamson, 674. P.2d 132, 133 (Utahl983); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah
1978). Excessive technical dissection of an informant's tip or of the nontechnical
language in the officer's affidavit is ill-suited to this task. 462 U.S. at 231-32, 235-36,
103 S.Ct. At 2328-30, 2330-31. In Gates, the Supreme Court emphasized that an
informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two relevant considerations,
among others, in determining the existence of probable cause under "a totality-of-thecircumstances." 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. At 2329-30. They are not strict,
independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A weakness in one or the
other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the totality there is substantial basis to find
probable cause. Id. at 230, 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332. The indicia of veracity,
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the practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair
probability that the contraband will be found in the place described.
With the foregoing legal framework in place, I will now proceed to consider the affidavit
supporting the search warrant in this case and the factual picture it created. Consistent with the
language of Gates, and the concepts embraced by Hansen, I read it in a nontechnical commonsense manner through the eyes of a layman, not with a grudging or negative attitude but
recognizing a strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to warrant. The end objective is
to determine if the magistrate who viewed the affidavit in that manner had a "substantial basis for
. . . [concluding] that a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing," Gates at 236, or
that there was "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime . . . [would] be found in a
particular place." Gates at 238; accord, Hansen at 130. I further avoid a "technical dissection of
an informant's tip or of the nontechnical language in the officer's affidavit," the same being "illsuited to the task" of a common sense analysis and construction. Id. [Emphasis added.]
As gleaned from the affidavit, the investigation conducted by the detectives of the Central
Utah Narcotics Task Force covered less than 2 months, commencing on June 19, 2002 and
ending with the issuance of the search warrant on August 14,2002. The affidavit contained
information from three sources; a citizen informant, police investigation and a confidential
informant. Defendant does not challenge the information supplied by the police and is obliged to
recognize that the information from the citizen informant is presumed valid and needs no
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(Utah App. 2001). The veracity of the confidential informant was buttressed in two ways. First,
it was corroborated by its consistency with the information received from the citizen informant.
Second, the confidential informant had in the past given information to the Task Force detective
which proved accurate. That is an accepted method for establishing an informant's veracity.
Hansen, at 130; citing State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203,1206 (Utah 1984), and McCray v. Illinois,
386 U.S. 300 (1967). Moreover, Utah has "never required that an affidavit be so specific as to
detail every prior occasion in which the informant's seed yieldedfruit."Hansen, at 130.
In a nut shell, the picture created for the magistrate was one where the citizen informant
supplied personal knowledge that Paula Poulson was selling methamphetamine for one Gary
Sorensen.4 The other facts supplied by the citizen informant suggest that the sales were being
made out of her personal residence. The citizen informant had seen Poulson at Sorensen's
residence more than once picking up methamphetamine. Since June 19, when the investigation
began, the citizen informant had seen a lot of short-term traffic arriving and departing from
Poulson's residence. The citizen informant supplied vehicle license plate numbers and personal
knowledge of the individuals who were arriving and departing from the Poulson residence. The

Admittedly, this is a conclusory observation, but it does not stand alone. It is supported and corroborated
by the other facts supplied by the citizen informant and by the police investigation and the statement of a confidential
informant. Moreover, as the Gates court observed, "Ordinary citizens do not provide extensive recitations of the
basis of their everyday observations." At 237. Such observations should not be viewed in isolation but as part of the
overall mix. It is the mix that must be the focus of the magistrate's evaluation.
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drug related offenses with seven of the eight having been convicted of the same. In addition to
the eight, the short-term traffic at the Poulson residence revealed fourteen other vehicles, some
on more than one occasion. Sorensen was one of the persons specifically identified as having
been at Poulson's residence on multiple occasions. Sorensen had previously been convicted of
possession and distribution of methamphetamine, and a search warrant executed at Sorensen's
residence six days before the search warrant in question had resulted in the seizure of
methamphetamine, scales, packaging material and other paraphernalia. Sorensen was not present
at his residence at the time of the search, but was thereafter seen at Poulson's residence on
August 9 and August 10.5 On August 12, barely two days before issuance of the search warrant
for Poulson's residence, the confidential informant advised the officers that Paula Poulson "has
been and is still selling a lot of methamphetamine for Gary Sorensen." Such was consistent with
all the other information in the affidavit and served to add an additional measure of currency.
Considering the foregoing in its totality and applying a common-sense approach, did the
magistrate have a "substantial basis f o r . . . [concluding]" that there was a "fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime... [would] be found" at Poulson's residence, or "that a search
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing?" I conclude that the answer to the question is yes. As

5

An arrest warrant for Sorensen had been issued after the search of his residence and was outstanding at
this time. All of these facts were included in the supporting affidavit.
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suppress is denied.
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Addendum B

ATTACHMENT A

AFFIDAVIT

GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT
SINCE JUNE 19TH, 2 002 I HA\E RECEIVED INFORMATION FROM A
CITIZEN INFORMANT REGARDING A LOT OF TRAFFIC THAT IS SHORT TERM,
ARRIVING AND DEPARTING WITHIN TWO TD THREE MINUTES AT THE RESIDENCE
OF PAULA POULSON AND TERRY HANKS . THIS RESIDENCE IS LOCATED AT 4 80
NORTH 100 WEST MT- PLEASANT, UTAH. DETECTIVES OF THE CENTRAL UTAH
NARCOTICS TASK FORCE HAVE BEEN WORKING THIS CASE SINCE JUNE 19TH,
2002.
THE CITIZEN INFORMANT GAVE ME INFORMATION ABOUT VEHICLE
LICENSES AND PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN GOING
TO THIS RESIDENCE. VEHICLE LICENSES HAVE BEEN RUN ON THE STATE
WIDE COMPUTER AND THE OWNERS OF THE VEHICLES IDENTIFIED.
ALSO
CRIMINAL HISTORIES OF THOSE SUBJECTS HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM THE
STATE COMPUTER.
THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS HAVE SHOWED UP AT THIS LOCATION ON
MORE THAN ONE OCCASION,
1.

GARY L. SORENSON D.O.B, 3-01-63 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR;
A. DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONVICTED
B. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE CONVICTED
C. CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON
D. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

2.

JOHN C, RAMEY, D.O.B. 10-16-58 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR:
A. AGGRAVATED BURGLARY
B- NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT POSSESSION
C. AMPHETAMINE POSSESSION
D. ASSAULT CONVICTED

3-

KENNETH HINTON D.O.B. 12-28-74 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR:
A. POSSESSION OF HALLUCINOGEN
B. POSSESSION OF NARCOTIC EQUIPMENT
C. POSSESSION OR USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE CONVICTED
D. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CONVICTED

4,

DAVID W. TIMMS D.O.B. 11-14-78 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR:
A. DISTRIBUTION/ MANUFACTURE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES
B. ESCAPE FROM OFFICIAL CUSTODY CONVICTED
C. POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED
D. POSSESSION OF PARAPHERNALIA

5.

JESSICA L. SHELLEY D,O.B, 11-05-78 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR:
A. POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE W/INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
B. POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
C. POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED
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D. POSSESSION OP DRUG PARAPHERNALIA CONVTCTED
E- JESSICA IS CURRENTLY AWAITING TRIAL FOR 2 COUNTS
DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAM.INE.
6.

ALLEN P. STEVENS D-O.B. 6-30-65 HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR:
A. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONVICTED
B. DOMESTIC ASSAULT

7.

CHESLEY L. CHRISTENSEN D.O.B. 7-13-65 HAS BEEN ARRESTED

FOR-:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

POSSESSION AND USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES CONVICTED
POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE
CHESLEY WAS ON FELONY PROBATION UNTIL 9-17-01

8. TERRY A. HANKS D.O.B. 10 -2.-3 -4 6 ( A CO-HABITANT OF THIS
RESIDENCE WITH PAULA POULSON) HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR:
A. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA CONVICTED
IN ADDITION TO THE NAMES LISTED ABOVE MORE THAN 14 OTHER
SEPARATE VEHICLES HAVE ARRIVED AT THIS RESIDENCE AT DIFFERENT TIMES
AND DATES, SOME OF THEM ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION.
IT IS THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF DETECTIVES OF THE TASK
FORCE THAT THIS ACTIVITY IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DISTRIBUTION OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.
ON 8-12-02 DETECTIVES JENKINS AND WHATCOTT MET WITH A
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT. THE INFORMANT STATED THAT PAULA POULSON
HAS 3EEN AND IS STILL SELLING A LOT OF METHAMPHETAMINE FOR GARY
SORENSON.
YOUR AFFIANT FEELS THIS INFORMATION IS RELIABLE FROM THIS
INFORMANT BECAUSE THIS COINCIDES WETH INFORMATION THAT DETECTIVES
THOMAS AND EKKER RECEIVED FROM A CITIZEN INFORMANT. THE CITIZEN
INFO]*MANT TOLD DETECTIVES THAT THE "INFORMANT HAS SEEN PAULA POULSON
AT GARY SORENSON'S
RESIDENCE MORE THAN ONCE PICKING UP
METHAMPHETAMINE. THE CITIZEN INFORMANT HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT
PAULA IS SELLING THE METHAMPHETAMINE FOR GARY SORENSON.
ON 8-9-02 DETECTIVES FROM THE CENTRAL UTAH NARCTICS TASK FORCE
AMONG OTHER OFFICERS EXECUTED A SEARCH WARRANT AT GARY SORENSON'S
RESIDENCE. FOUND AT THIS RESIDENCE WERE METHAMPHETAMINE, SCALES,
PACKAGING MATERIAL, OWE SHEETS PARAPHERNALIA I.E. GLASS PIPES FOR
METH AND MARIJUANA. GARY SORENSON WAS NOT AT THE RESIDENCE AT THAT
TIME. GARY SORENSON HAS BEEN SEEN AT PAULA POULSON'S RESIDENCE ON
8-9-02 AND 8-10-02. THERE IS CURRSNTLY AN ARREST WARRANT OUT FOR
GARY SORENSON.
YOUR AFFIANT THEREFORE PRAYS A SEARCH WARRANT BE GRANTED FOR
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THE RESIDENCE OF PAULA POULSON LOCATED AT 480 NORTH 100 WEST MT.
PLEASANT, UTAH. TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE, ANY OUTBUILDING, PERSONS AND
VEHICLES THAT ARE AT THE RESIDENCE AT THE TIME THE SEARCH WARRANT
IS EXECUTED. WE ALSO ASK TO SEARCH FOR EVIDENCE IN ANY COMPUTER AT
THIS RESIDENCE. THE COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL STORAGE MEDIA THAT
WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD
ROMS AND ANY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED TO THE INTERNET. THE
PURPOSE FOR THIS IS THAT COMPUTERS ARE OFTEN FOUND IN HOMES, THAT
INFORMATION SUCH AS OWE SHEETS, NAMES AND ADDRESSES CAN BE STORED
HERE. ALSO THERE CAN BE PHOTOS THAT CAN IDENTIFY SUBJECTS. WE
ALSO ASK TO SEARCH E-MAILS FOR CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO
PURC.-iASE AND SALES OF METHAMPHETAMINE, BILLS OWING AND BILLS PAID.
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Addendum C

IN THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OP SANPETE
STATE OP UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SANPETE )
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFCRE THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAUL LYMAN
The undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That affiant has reason to believe that
(X ) on the premises known as 48 0 NORTH 100 WEST, MT.
PLEASANT, UTAH THE RESIDENCE HAS WOOD SIDING SOME WHITE SOME
BROWN, CHARCOAL COLORED ROOF, MAIN ENTRANCE FACES SOUTH. ALSO A
WEST FACING DOOR ON THE NORTH END OF THE HOUSE.
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as ANY VEHICLES AT THE
RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS WARRANT. In the
City of MT. PLEASANT, County of SANPETE, State of Utah, there is
now certain property or evidence described as:
METHAMPHETAMINE, PARAPHERNALIA TO CONSUME METHAMPHETAMINE,
OWE SHEETS, PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LEGAL OWNERSHIP OF THE
HOME, SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIAL. COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL
STORAGE MEDIA THAT WOULD INCLUDE 3UT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY
DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD ROMS AND AMY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED
TO THE INTERNET.
and ^hat said property or evidence:
(X) is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed.
(X) has been used as a means of committing a public
offense.
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a
means of committing or concealing a public offense.
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
( ) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct.
I believe the property and evidence described above is evidence
of the crime of DISTRIBUTION OF METHAMPHETAMINE.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search
Warrant, are:
SEE: ATTACHMENT A AND B
Your affiant considers the information received from the

confidential informant reliable because (if any information is
obtained from an unnamed informant):
THE INFORMANT GAVE INFORMATION TN THE PAST THAT HAS BEEN
PROVEN ACCURATE BY DET. THOMAS.

Your affiant has verified the above information to be correct and
accuirate because of the following independent investigation:
DET. THOMAS SPOKE WITH A CITIZEN INFORMANT THAT CONFIRMED
THE .INFORMATION GIVE BY THE CONFIDENTIAL, INFORMANT.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for
the seizure of said items
(X) m the daytime.
( } at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary 1 o seise the property prior to
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or
for other good reason.
(X) (no knock) to execute without notice of authority or
purpose, (proof under oath being shown that the object
of this search may be quj ckly destroyed or disposed of
or that harm may result to any person if notice were
given) . THAT SOME OF THE SUBJECTS GOING TO THIS
RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OP VIOLENCE RANGING FROM
ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS VIOLATIONS. IT
IS ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AMD TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT
THAT IF OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE,
NOT ONLY IS THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BUT THE
SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND INNOCENT BY
STANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE IT REMOVES THE
POSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE
SITUATIONS, AND BARRICADED STAND-OFFS.

FIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14TTT rlny of

AUGUST, 2002.
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Addendum D

IN THE 6TH DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OP SANPETE, STATE OF UTAH
STATS OP UTAH

)
; ss.
COUNrY OF SANPETE )
SEARCH WARRANT
To any Peace Officer in the State of Utah:
Proof of affidavit under oath having been made this day
before me by DJ3T. CLARK THOMAS, I ,im satisfied that there is
probable cause to believe that
(X) on the premises known as 480 NORTH 100 WEST, MT.
PLEA.3ANT, UTAH, THE RESIDENCE HAS WOOD SIDING SOME WHITE SOME
BROWN. CHARCOAL COLORED ROOF. MAIN ENTRANCE FACES SOUTH. ALSO
A WE;3T FACING DOOR ON THE NORTH END OF THE HOUSE.
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as ANY VEHICLES AT THE
RESIDENCE AT THE TIME OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS
WARRANT.
In the City of MT. PLEASANT, County of SANPETE, State of Utah,
there is now certain property or evidence described as:
(items in search of)
METHAMPHETAMINE, PARAPHERNALIA TO CONSUME METHAMPHETAMINE,
OWE SHEETS, PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS TO SHOW LEGAL OWNERSHIP OP THE
HOME, SCALES AND PACKAGING MATERIAL. COMPUTER AND ANY DIGITAL
STORAGE MEDIA THAT WOULD INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO 3X5 FLOPPY
DISKS, ZIP DISKS AND CD ROMS AND ANY DEVICE THAT CAN BE CONNECTED
TO THE INTERNET.
which property or evidence:
(X) is unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed.
(X) has been used as a means to commit a public offense.
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a
means of committing or concealing a public offense.
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct.
( ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a
person or entity not a pe.rty to the illegal conduct and
good cause being shown that the seizure cannot be
obtained by subpoena without the evidence being
concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered.
(Conditions
for service of this Warrant are included or attached
hereto)
You are therefore commanded:
(X) in the daytime
( ) at any time day or night (good cause havi.nq b?e-n shown)
(X) (no knock) to execute without notice of authority or
purpose, (proof under oath being shown that the object

of this search may be quickly destroyed or disposed of
or that harm may result to any person if notice were
given) THAT SOME OF THI1 SUBJECTS GOING TO THIS
RESIDENCE HAVE A HISTORY OP VIOLENCE RANGING FROM
ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS VIOLATIONS.
IT IS ALSO THE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING OF YOUR AFFIANT
THAT IF OFFICERS ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF SURPRISE,
NOT ONLY IS THE EVIDENCE BETTER PRESERVED, BUT THE
SAFETY OF THE OFFICERS, SUSPECTS, AND INNOCENT BYSTANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE IT REMOVES THE
POSSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE DESTRUCTION, HOSTAGE
SITUATIONS, AND BARRICAEED STAND-OFFS.

to rrake a search of the above-named or described person (s) ,
premises and vehicle(s) for the herein-above described property
or evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to
bring it forthwith before me at the 6TH DISTRICT Court, County of
SANPETE, State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody,
subject to the order of this Court.
Given under my hand and dated this 14TH day of AUGUST, 2002.

. Justice of I the Peace
T^jw cT*
Court
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Addendum E

ATTACHMENT B
GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A NON ALERT NO KNOCK SEARCH WARRANT
INFORMATION R E C E I V E D BY D E T E C T I V E THOMAS OF THE TASK FORCE I S
THAT SOME OF THE S U B J E C T S GOINGTO T H I S R E S I D E N C E HAVE A HISTORY OF
V I O L E N C E RANGING FROM ASSAULT TO WEAPONS AND CONCEALED WEAPONS
VIOLATIONS.
I T I S ALSO THE E X P E R I E N C E AND T R A I N I N G OF YOUR A F F I A N T
THAT I F O F F I C E R S ARE ALLOWED THE ELEMENT OF S U R P R I S E , NOT ONLY I S
THE EVIDENCE BETTER P R E S E R V E D , BLT THE SAFETY OF THE O F F I C E R S ,
S U S P 3 C T S , AND INNOCENT BY STANDERS ARE BETTER PROTECTED BECAUSE I T
REMOVES
THE
POSSIBILITY
OF
EVIDENCE
DESTRUCTION,
HOSTAGE
S I T U A T I O N S , AND BARRICADED S T A N D - O F F S .
WE
GIVEN.
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Addendum F

1

informants here, and I do not know which one they speak

2

of.

3

The one indicates that they were watching the

4

residence, and for some unspecified time period, certain

5

people were arriving and leaving.

6

There's another reference in the Affidavit that

7

somebody —

8

informant, which we've —

9

informant, said that Paula Poulson was selling

10

a confidential informant —

a citizen

probably is the confidential

methamphetamine for Gary Sorensen.

11

Is that —

the citizen informant is now a

12

confidential informant, or which one is the confidential

13

informant?

14

MR. KENNARD:

Yes, Your Honor, if I can respond?

15

I think what I did in my motion is:

After I

16

received his motion, I reviewed everything.

17

—

18

informants:

19

one is a confidential informant; and then the one that he's

20

speaking about now is a third informant.

21
22
23
24
25

there's two informants —

And there is

no, there's three

One of them is a citizen informant; another

And that third informant is designated "citizen
informant".
MR. CARTER:

And that's the one that says Paula was

selling?
MR. KENNARD:

Yes.

THE COURT:

It is.

MR. KENNARD:

Two of them —

two of the informants

say that Paula was selling.
This last one, when I found out now that she made
this statement to the police, that she was incarcerated.
And I don't think that she would qualify for the
presumed reliability as a citizen informant, because she
gave the confession, if you will, after she had been
arrested.
THE COURT:

The last one?

MR. KENNARD:
THE COURT:

The last one.

Okay.

MR. KENNARD:

So I put that in my motion just out of

fairness to kind of, you know, let the Court know that
probably what we are dealing with is someone who's not, you
know, presumed to be reliable because they possibly could
have had an axe to grind, could be asking, you know, for
favors in return for this.
But, really, I think the whole question comes down
to whether the four corners of the —

the four corners of

that document, at the time it was signed by the Judge,
established probable cause.
And maybe this issue would go more toward whether
there was some subversity (sic) by the police officers.
THE COURT:

All right.

Where's the Affidavit?

F

